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 NOTE 
Statutory Caps on Punitive Damages: Are 
They Infringing on Your Rights? 
Lewellen v. Franklin, 441 S.W.3d 136 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
LYNSEY RUSSELL* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The constitutionality of punitive damages is historically a highly debat-
ed area of the law.  Due process challenges led to increased limitations,1 and 
increased limitations led to further constitutional challenges;2 the conflict 
seemed to be never ending.  While history and the current nationwide trend3 
suggest that statutory restrictions on punitive damages are favorable, the Su-
preme Court of Missouri recently held that the statutory cap imposed by Mis-
souri Revised Statutes Section 510.265 was unconstitutional in certain cases 
and struck the statutory punitive damages cap in a limited context.4 
 
* B.A., Missouri State University, 2012; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri 
School of Law, 2016; Associate Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2015–2016.  I would 
like to extend a special thank you to Associate Dean Christina Wells and the entire 
Law Review staff for their support and guidance in writing this Note. 
 1. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (suggesting that 
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages 
rarely satisfy due process); BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (establish-
ing three guideposts for evaluation of punitive damages); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alli-
ance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (describing a “general concern of reasonable-
ness” in determining constitutionality of punitive damages); Rodriguez v. Suzuki 
Motor Corp., 936 S.W.2d 104, 110 (Mo. 1996) (en banc) (establishing a heightened 
standard of proof for the establishment of punitive damages). 
 2. See Estate of Overbey v. Chad Franklin Nat’l Auto Sales N., LLC, 361 
S.W.3d 364 (Mo. 2012) (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 510.265 (Cum. Supp. 2013), invali-
dated by Lewellen v. Franklin, 441 S.W.3d 136 (Mo. 2014) (en banc)) (arguing that 
Section 510.265’s punitive damages cap violated the right to a trial by jury, separation 
of powers, equal protection, and the prohibition on special laws); Lewellen, 441 
S.W.3d 136 (challenging the statutory cap on punitive damages, with appellant argu-
ing that it violated her rights to a jury trial, equal protection, and open courts, as well 
as violating the separation of powers doctrine and the prohibition against special leg-
islation). 
 3. Mark A. Behrens, Missouri Supreme Court Invalidates State’s Legislative 
Cap on Punitive Damages, WLF LEGAL PULSE (Sept. 11, 2014), 
http://wlflegalpulse.com/2014/09/11/missouri-supreme-court-invalidates-states-
legislative-cap-on-punitive-damages/. 
 4. Lewellen, 441 S.W.3d 136. 
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The argument surrounding statutory caps on punitive damages seems to 
be black and white – either for or against.  However, this may not be the case, 
as a closer evaluation of Missouri history and the instant decision suggest that 
the issue is more nuanced.  First, Part II of this Note summarizes the facts, 
procedural posture, and holding of Lewellen v. Franklin.  Second, Part III 
explores the legal background of punitive damages and the limitations that 
have historically been imposed on them.  Next, Part IV describes the majority 
opinion in Lewellen and examines the Supreme Court of Missouri’s rationale.  
Lastly, Part IV Note examines the current nationwide trend, analyzes how 
Missouri’s ruling fits within this trend, and discusses the future impact of the 
instant case. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
Lillian Lewellen brought an action against Chad Franklin and Chad 
Franklin National Auto Sales North, LLC (“National”) for common law 
fraudulent misrepresentation and unlawful merchandising practices under the 
Missouri Merchandising Practice Act (“MMPA”).5  Lewellen alleged fraudu-
lent misrepresentation and unlawful practices occurred throughout her cus-
tomer relationship with Franklin and National.6 
Franklin owned National, a car dealership located in Kansas City, Mis-
souri.7  In hopes of increasing vehicle sales at the dealership, Franklin and 
National implemented a program that allowed customers to purchase a vehi-
cle from the dealership for only $49, $69, or $89 per month.8  Lured in by 
National’s aggressive advertising and in need of a vehicle, Lewellen visited 
National and expressed her interest in purchasing a vehicle for $49 per 
month.9  National’s employees helped Lewellen select a 2002 Lincoln that 
qualified for the program and assured her that her obligation would only be 
$49 per month.10  The salesman explained to Lewellen the workings of the 
five-year, $49-a-month program.11  He communicated that the dealership 
would calculate her monthly payment based on her income but would subse-
quently send her a check for the difference between the monthly payment and 
her $49 per month obligation; whereby, she would only actually pay $49 per 
month.12 
Soon after the sale, Lewellen contacted National multiple times because 
she had not received the check for the difference between payments as prom-
 
 5. Id. at 139. 
 6. Id. at 139–41. 
 7. Id. at 139–40. 
 8. Id. at 140. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
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ised.13  Eventually, National sent Lewellen a check in the amount of 
$3287.30, which covered nine months of the portion of payments that Na-
tional was responsible for under the agreement.14  Because Lewellen never 
received a check for the remaining three months of the first year, Lewellen 
was unable to make her payments in full, and eventually her car was repos-
sessed.15 
After trial, a jury awarded Lewellen $25,000 in actual damages for her 
fraudulent misrepresentation claim against Franklin and National and an addi-
tional $25,000 in actual damages for her MMPA claim against Franklin and 
National.16  The jury also found Franklin and National liable for punitive 
damages and awarded Lewellen $1 million for each claim.17  Lewellen chose 
to take judgment for actual and punitive damages for common law fraudulent 
misrepresentation against Franklin and judgment for actual and punitive dam-
ages for the violation of the MMPA against National.18 
Franklin and National moved to reduce the punitive damage awards pur-
suant to Missouri Revised Statutes Section 510.265, which states that puni-
tive damages are not to exceed the greater of $500,000 or five times the 
judgment awarded in favor of the plaintiff.19  The trial court sustained their 
motion and reduced the punitive damage awards against Franklin and Nation-
al to $500,000 and $539,050 respectively.20  In doing so, the court rejected 
Franklin and National’s claim that the punitive damage awards violated their 
due process rights.21  It also rejected Lewellen’s claims that the cap on puni-
tive damages violated her right to a trial by jury.22 
In the instant case, Lewellen, Franklin, and National appealed the trial 
court’s judgment and reintroduced their claims.23  The Supreme Court of 
Missouri analyzed the language of the Missouri Constitution, which provides, 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 140–41. 
 15. Id. at 141. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 141–42.  Because they were not inconsistent, both of Lewellen’s claims 
were submitted to jury.  Id.  However, under the merger of damages doctrine, she 
could not recover more than one full recovery for the same harm.  See Trimble v. 
Prana, 167 S.W.3d 706, 711 (Mo. 2005) (en banc).  Because the harm suffered by the 
fraudulent misrepresentation was the same as the harm caused by the MMPA viola-
tion, Lewellen had to elect which theory under which she would take the judgments 
against Franklin and National.  Lewellen, 441 S.W.3d at 142 n.7. 
 19. Lewellen, 441 S.W.3d at 142. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  Lewellen also claimed that the damages cap violated due process, equal 
protection, open courts, the separation of powers doctrine, and the prohibition against 
special legislation; these claims are beyond the scope of this Note.  Id. 
 23. Id.  Because Lewellen challenged the validity of Section 510.265, the Su-
preme Court of Missouri has exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal.  MO. CONST. art. 
V, § 3; Lewellen, 441 S.W.3d at 139. 
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“That the right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate.”24  
The court reasoned that “‘[s]hall remain inviolate’ . . . means that any change 
in the right to a jury determination of damages as it existed in 1820 is uncon-
stitutional.”25  The court noted that in 1820,26 the right to a jury trial in an 
action for fraud included the right to a determination of punitive damages.27  
Thus, because Section 510.265 imposed a legislative limit on the jury’s as-
sessment of punitive damages when such a limit did not exist at the time the 
Missouri Constitution was adopted, the court found the statutory cap to be 
unconstitutional.28 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Punitive damages are deeply rooted in the history of American law.  
These damages, awarded in addition to compensatory damages, serve the 
dual purposes of punishing past wrongdoing and deterring future wrongful 
behavior.29  Embedded in the history of punitive damages is a great deal of 
debate, as punitive damages have been a subject of controversy since their 
origination.  As a result, both the constitutionality of punitive damages, as 
well as the caps imposed upon them, are often challenged.30 
A.  The Supreme Court of the United States’s Review of the            
Constitutionality of Punitive Damages 
The constitutional debate regarding punitive damages hinges on due 
process considerations, as scholars disagree about whether the imposition of 
punitive damages passes constitutional muster.  Even when it is agreed that 
punitive damages should exist, the amount of punitive damages that can be 
constitutionally imposed is debated.31  Do punitive damages comport with 
due process?  Is there a limit on the amount of punitive damages that comport 
with due process?  The expansive history of this area of law shows that the 
answers to these questions are complex. 
The Due Process Clause serves as a safeguard against the arbitrary deni-
al of life, liberty, or property by the government,32 such that it prohibits the 
 
 24. MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(a). 
 25. Lewellen, 441 S.W.3d at 143. 
 26. Id.  Missouri’s first constitution was adopted in 1820.  Id. 
 27. Id. at 150. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 936 S.W.2d 104, 110 (Mo. 1996) (en 
banc). 
 30. JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 651 (8th ed. 2012). 
 31. Courts have also disagreed on what actions expose a defendant to punitive 
damages; this is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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imposition of grossly excessive or subjective punishments.33  Early on, many 
argued that punitive damages were per se unconstitutional: “The idea is 
wrong.  It is a monstrous heresy.  It is an unsightly and an unhealthy excres-
cence, deforming the symmetry of the body of law.”34  This strong opposition 
arose from excessive punitive damage awards and alleged arbitrary decision-
making.35  The early per se unconstitutional label on punitive damages was 
removed as courts began to shed light on punitive damages and their constitu-
tionality.  The idea that punitive damages could accord with due process be-
gan to receive acceptance. 
Acknowledging this idea, the Supreme Court of the United States still 
expressed its “concern about punitive damages that ‘run wild’” and recog-
nized a need for limitations.36  While many courts echoed these sentiments, 
the Court confronted the due process challenge to punitive damages head-on 
in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip.37  The opinion began, “This 
case is yet another that presents a challenge to a punitive damages award,” 38 
and set out “to review the punitive damages procedures and award in the light 
of the long-enduring debate about their propriety.” 39 
The Court first discussed the common law method for determining the 
amount of punitive damages to be awarded. 40  Under the common law ap-
proach, the amount of punitive damages was initially determined by the jury, 
which was instructed to consider the gravity of the wrong committed and the 
need to deter similar conduct.41  To ensure the award was reasonable, the trial 
and appellate courts would then review the jury determination.42  The Court 
noted that every state and federal court that had considered this two-step 
mechanism had determined that it, in itself, did not violate due process.43 
Although not violative of due process, the two-step mechanism was un-
satisfactory to the Court, which honed in on the need for additional limita-
tions in awarding punitive damages.44   The Court placed a limitation of “rea-
sonableness” on punitive damages and announced, “As long as the discretion 
is exercised with reasonable constraints, due process is satisfied.”45  Where 
the punitive damages awarded did “not exceed an amount that [would] ac-
complish society’s goals of punishment and deterrence,” the damages were 
 
 33. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003). 
 34. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 7 n.4 (1991) (citing Fay v. 
Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382 (N.H. 1872)). 
 35. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 587 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 36. Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 37. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1. 
 38. Id. at 4. 
 39. Id. at 8. 
 40. Id. at 15. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 17. 
 44. Id. at 18. 
 45. Id. at 20 (emphasis added). 
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not viewed by the Court as “cross[ing] the line into the area of constitutional 
impropriety.”46  Although the punitive damages awarded in Haslip were more 
than four times the amount of compensatory damages,47 the Court determined 
that the punitive damages assessed by the jury against the defendant did not 
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.48  The Court 
applied its new “limitation” and reasoned that “the instructions . . . enlight-
ened the jury as to the punitive damages’ nature and purpose, identified the 
damages as punishment for civil wrongdoing of the kind involved, and ex-
plained that their imposition was not compulsory.”49  This was deemed a 
“reasonable constraint” on the application of the common law in reaching the 
award, such that the damages did not violate due process.50  In its review of 
punitive damages procedures, the Court in Haslip refused to draw a line “be-
tween the constitutionally acceptable and constitutionally unacceptable.” 51 
Courts following the Haslip decision held true to the Court’s determina-
tion that punitive damages may be properly imposed to further a State’s legit-
imate interests in punishment and deterrence and continued to measure puni-
tive damages against the reasonableness standard.52  Additionally, as in 
Haslip, subsequent cases “consistently rejected the notion that the constitu-
tional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula.”53 
To aid in the reasonableness evaluation, the Court introduced three 
guideposts in BMW of North America v. Gore.  Courts examining the consti-
tutionality of punitive damages were to review: (1) the degree of reprehensi-
bility; (2) the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages; and (3) the 
sanctions for comparable misconduct.54  In Gore, the plaintiff suffered mini-
mal economic harm when BMW failed to disclose that the plaintiff’s vehicle 
had been repainted prior to his purchase.55  Plaintiff argued that this failure to 
disclose the refinishing of cars sold as “new” was a common practice of 
BMW, and a jury awarded the plaintiff $4000 in compensatory damages and 
$4 million in punitive damages.56  The Court reversed the award due to its 
finding that BMW’s conduct was not “sufficiently egregious to justify” such 
a large punitive sanction.57  The Court developed the guideposts to ensure 
that a person receives fair notice of the conduct that will subject him to pun-
 
 46. Id. at 21, 24 (quoting Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218, 222 (1989)). 
 47. Id. at 23. 
 48. Id. at 19. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 19–20. 
 51. Id. at 18. 
 52. See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 587 (1996) (Breyer, J., concur-
ring); see also TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993). 
 53. BMW, 517 U.S. at 582. 
 54. Id. at 575. 
 55. Id. at 564. 
 56. Id. at 564–65. 
 57. Id. at 585. 
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ishment and the severity of that punishment.58  Using the guideposts, the 
Court determined that because BMW’s conduct was not egregiously improper 
and the jury’s award likely erroneously considered out-of-state conduct, the 
award in this case “transcend[ed] the constitutional limit.”59 
In State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Campbell, the Court ap-
plied Gore’s guideposts in reaching its decision and reiterated the importance 
of applying the guideposts for direction.60  In Campbell, the plaintiff caused a 
car accident in which one person was killed and another was permanently 
disabled.61  The plaintiff’s insurer, State Farm, contested liability, refused to 
settle, ignored its own investigator’s advice, and took the case to trial.62  
Originally, State Farm assured the plaintiff that “their assets were safe, that 
they had no liability for the accident.”63  Upon State Farm’s failure at trial, a 
judgment in the amount of $185,849 was entered and State Farm coldly in-
formed the plaintiff that he “may want to put for sale signs on [his] property 
to get things moving.”64  The plaintiff then sued State Farm and presented 
evidence that State Farm’s decision to take the case to trial was part of a na-
tional scheme designed to meet corporate fiscal goals.65 
In applying Gore’s second guidepost to the facts of Campbell,66 the 
Court noted its continued reluctance to identify concrete constitutional limits 
on punitive damage awards.67  However, the Court did go one step further in 
announcing that low multipliers are more likely to comport with due process 
and that “few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages . . . will satisfy due process.”68  This announcement 
indicated a hardening of the ratio guideline and suggested a transformation of 
the guidepost from a factor for consideration into a requirement for constitu-
tionality. 
While the majority suggested ratios that approached bright line rules69 
and signaled the desire for additional limitations, the dissent argued that limi-
tations had gone too far.70  Justice Scalia noted that the Due Process Clause 
 
 58. Id. at 574–75. 
 59. Id. at 572–74, 580, 585–86. 
 60. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003). 
 61. Id. at 412–13. 
 62. Id. at 413. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 414–15. 
 66. The second guidepost evaluates the ratio between the actual harm to the 
plaintiff and the punitive damages award.  BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 
580 (1996). 
 67. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 424–25. 
 68. Id. at 425. 
 69. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 
239 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 4th ed. 2010). 
 70. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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does not even require substantive protections against “excessive” awards.71  
Justice Ginsburg agreed that the limitations were excessive and stated, “[T]he 
numerical controls today’s decision installs seem to me boldly out of or-
der.”72  She additionally commented, “Even if I were prepared to accept the 
flexible guides prescribed in Gore, I would not join the Court’s swift conver-
sion of those guides into instructions that begin to resemble marching or-
ders.”73 
Despite expression throughout history that the limitations as expanded 
were overreaching, many continuously yearned for a standard stricter than 
that of a “reasonableness” formulation.  Courts seeking stricter boundaries on 
awards of punitive damages devised a variety of restraints.  In particular, 
Missouri enforced a heightened standard of proof74 and a statutory cap.75 
B.  Statutory Caps Imposed on Punitive Damages in Missouri 
Punitive damages found their way into Missouri’s tort reform when the 
legislature attempted to resolve the many inconsistencies in this area of the 
law.  With the Tort Reform Act of 2005, the Missouri legislature set a statuto-
ry cap on punitive damages.76  Section 510.265 reads, “No award of punitive 
damages against any defendant shall exceed the greater of: (1) five hundred 
thousand dollars; or (2) five times the net amount of the judgment awarded to 
the plaintiff against the defendant.”77  Statutory caps on punitive damages, 
such as Missouri’s, introduce a second constitutional inquiry.  Do statutory 
caps on punitive damages violate the right to trial by jury? 
The Supreme Court of Missouri examined the constitutionality of Sec-
tion 510.265 in Estate of Overbey v. Chad Franklin National Auto Sales 
North, LLC and determined that the statutory cap did not violate the right to a 
trial by jury.78  Here, the Overbeys sued Franklin and National for violations 
under the MMPA.79  A jury found in favor of the Overbeys and awarded them 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 438 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 73. Id. at 439. 
 74. Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 936 S.W.2d 104, 110–11 (Mo. 1996) (en 
banc) (“For common law punitive damages claims, the evidence must meet the clear 
and convincing standard of proof.”). 
 75. MO. REV. STAT. § 510.265 (Cum. Supp. 2013), invalidated by Lewellen v. 
Franklin, 441 S.W.3d 136 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 76. H.B. 393, 93rd Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2005), 
http://www.house.mo.gov/content.aspx?info=/bills051/bills/HB393.htm. 
 77. § 510.265. 
 78. Estate of Overbey v. Chad Franklin Nat’l Auto Sales N., LLC, 361 S.W.3d 
364 (Mo. 2012). 
 79. Id. at 369.  In this case, National ran television commercials advertising a 
“payment-for-life membership plan” for purchasing a vehicle from the dealership.  Id.  
The commercials promised that buyers would lock in a low monthly payment for the 
rest of their lives and drive a different vehicle every single year forever.  Id.  “Your 
8
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$76,000 in actual damages and $250,000 in punitive damages against Nation-
al and $4500 in actual damages and $1 million in punitive damages against 
Franklin.80  Franklin moved to reduce the punitive damages award pursuant 
to Section 510.265; the trial court granted the motion and reduced the $1 mil-
lion punitive damage award to $500,000.81  The trial court rejected the 
Overbeys’ claim that the cap on punitive damages violated their right to a 
trial by jury.82 
The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the reduction of the punitive 
damage awards and held that the application of Section 510.265 to the recov-
ery of punitive damages under the MMPA, a statutory cause of action, did not 
violate the Missouri Constitution’s guarantee of the right to a jury trial.83  The 
court reasoned that the legislature created the MMPA, such that it had the 
right to set limits on the remedies provided by Section 510.265 and could do 
so without violating the Overbeys’ right to a trial by jury.84  The court noted 
that this may not have been the case had the Overbeys chosen to bring their 
claim as a common law fraud claim.85 
Subsequently, in Watts v. Lester E. Cox Medical Centers, the Supreme 
Court of Missouri determined that the statutory cap imposed on non-
economic damages by Missouri Revised Statutes Section 538.210 violated 
the right to a trial by jury.86  While this case did not deal with a punitive dam-
age cap, it was vital to the development of Missouri’s case law on punitive 
damage caps and significantly contributes to the analysis of this topic.87  
Here, the jury awarded the plaintiff $1.45 million in non-economic damages 
and $3.371 million in future medical damages on her medical malpractice 
 
initial monthly payment will never change and you can cancel your membership 
whenever you want.”  Id.  The Overbeys went to the dealership, interested in the 
membership plan.  Id.  They were given several assurances by National sales person-
nel that if they paid $500 to join the program, the actual annual monthly payment 
would be only $49.  Id. at 369–70.  The Overbeys signed the contract.  Id. at 370.  
When the Overbey’s returned to National to trade in their vehicle for another vehicle, 
they were told that the salesperson who sold them the original car was no longer there 
and that the current employees were not aware of any provision allowing the 
Overbeys to trade their vehicle in at that time.  Id.  The Overbeys were told they were 
obligated to pay $719.52 per month for the 65 months remaining on the contract for 
the original vehicle.  Id.  Franklin also denied knowledge of the original deal.  Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 370–71. 
 82. Id. at 371.  The Overbeys also claimed that the statutory cap constituted a 
special law prohibited by the Missouri Constitution and violated due process princi-
ples, equal protection, and the separation of powers doctrine.  Id. at 374. 
 83. Id. at 376. 
 84. Id. at 375. 
 85. Id. at 376–77. 
 86. MO. REV. STAT. § 538.210 (2000), invalidated by Watts v. Lester E. Cox 
Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012) (en banc), amended by 2015 Mo. Legis. Serv. 
S.B. 239 (West). 
 87. See Lewellen v. Franklin, 441 S.W.3d 136 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
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claim.88  As required by Section 538.210, the trial court reduced the non-
economic damages to $350,000.89  The plaintiff appealed, reasoning that the 
cap on non-economic damages violated the right to a jury trial.90 
In analyzing the cap, the Supreme Court of Missouri followed the strict 
language contained in Article I, Section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution, 
which requires that a “right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain 
inviolate.”91  First, the court determined that “heretofore enjoyed” means that 
“‘[c]itizens of Missouri are entitled to a jury trial in all actions to which they 
would have been entitled to a jury when the Missouri Constitution was adopt-
ed’ in 1820.”92  Thus, the Missouri Constitution entitles a plaintiff to a jury 
trial on his or her claim for damages if Missouri common law entitled a plain-
tiff to a jury trial on that issue in 1820.93  Second, the court noted that “invio-
late” is defined as “free from change or blemish, pure or unbroken.”94  Thus, 
if a statutory cap changes the common law right to a jury determination of 
damages, the right no longer remains “inviolate,” and the cap is unconstitu-
tional.95  Because the court determined that a plaintiff in 1820 would have 
had a right to a jury trial on the issue of non-economic damages, and because 
it established that Section 538.210 altered the purpose of the jury in determin-
ing the amount of damages sustained by a plaintiff, the court held that the 
statutory cap in question was unconstitutional.96 
In Overbey, the court upheld the statutory reduction of damages; in 
Watts, the court overturned the statutory reduction of damages.  The two de-
cisions appear at odds, but this can be explained by distinguishing the cases.  
The Overbey plaintiffs brought a statutory cause of action; the Watts plaintiff 
brought a common law cause of action.  This distinguishing factor and the 
underlying rule of law are brought to light in the instant case, Lewellen v. 
Franklin. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
Using a de novo standard of review, the Supreme Court of Missouri held 
that the mandated reduction of punitive damages under Section 510.265 un-
constitutionally infringed Lewellen’s right to a jury trial and that the damages 
awarded to Lewellen did not violate Franklin’s due process rights.97 
 
 88. Watts, 376 S.W.3d at 635. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id.  Plaintiff also alleged that Section 538.210 violated several other provi-
sions of the Missouri Constitution.  Id. at 635, n.2. 
 91. Id. at 637. 
 92. Id. at 638 (quoting State ex rel. Diehl v. O’Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Mo. 
2003) (en banc)). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. (citing WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY 1190 (3rd ed. 1993)). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 636. 
 97. Lewellen v. Franklin, 441 S.W.3d 136, 150–51 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
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The court first noted that statutes are presumed valid and will only be 
declared unconstitutional if the challenger provides that the statute “clearly 
and undoubtedly violates the constitutional limitations.”98  With the burden of 
proof established, the court announced that Watts was controlling on the issue 
of whether the application of Section 510.265 in a cause of action that existed 
in 1820 violates the right to a trial by jury.99  First, in 1820, there existed a 
right to a jury determination of the amount of punitive damages in a cause of 
action for fraud.100  Additionally, at the time the Missouri Constitution was 
adopted, the assessment of punitive damages was a function reserved exclu-
sively for the jury.101 
The court next reiterated that the guarantee to a jury trial, provided in 
the Missouri Constitution, is violated by a statute that provides for punitive 
damages, but precludes the jury from determining the amount of punitive 
damages.102  The court expressed that it is clear from Overbey that there is a 
right to a jury trial on punitive damages.103  Therefore, the court held that 
under Missouri law, the cap imposed by Section 510.265 “necessarily 
change[d] and impair[ed] the right of a trial by jury ‘as heretofore en-
joyed.’”104  Further, “Because section 510.265 chang[ed] the right to a jury 
determination of punitive damages as it existed in 1820, it unconstitutionally 
infringe[d] on Ms. Lewellen’s right to a trial by jury protected by article I, 
section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution.”105 
A party seeking punitive damages for fraud in 1820 would have had the 
right to a jury determination of punitive damages; thus, the statutory reduc-
 
 98. Id. at 143. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 144. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. (citing Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012) 
(en banc)). 
 105. Id.  The court noted that Section 510.265 was not a codification of due pro-
cess; rather, it was applied “wholly independent of the facts of the case.”  Id. at 145.  
Accordingly, the court advised that its striking of Section 510.265 did not imply that 
the right conferred by the Missouri Constitution overrode the Due Process Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution; thus, courts still have the duty to review punitive damage 
awards to ensure that they comport with due process.  Id.  Because the court held that 
the statutory cap did not apply to the punitive damages in this case, the court went on 
to determine whether the amount of punitive damages awarded – without a cap – 
violated Franklin and National’s due process rights.  Id.  The court examined Gore’s 
three guideposts: (1) the reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the dis-
parity between the actual harm and the punitive damages award; and (3) the differ-
ence between the punitive damages award and the penalties authorized in comparable 
cases.  Id. at 145–46.  After consideration of these posts, the court held that the puni-
tive damages awarded against Franklin and National were not grossly excessive, and, 
therefore, did not violate their due process rights.  Id. at 148. 
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tion of Lewellen’s punitive damages award pursuant to Section 510.265 was 
unconstitutional.106 
V.  COMMENT 
With its decision in Lewellen v. Franklin, Missouri departed not only 
from state precedent, but also from the nationwide trend of upholding legisla-
tive limits on punitive damages.107  As one author put it, “The reality is the 
court literally took a judicial wrecking ball to 2005 reform action and 20 
years of settled constitutional law.”108 
Rather than following the trend, the outlier holding in the instant case 
more closely conforms to the initial view of statutory limitations on punitive 
damages – that they are unconstitutional.109  Although legislatures limited 
punitive damages in many ways prior to 1987, there was not a great deal of 
challenges to statutory restrictions.110  However, subsequent waves of tort 
reform sparked the constitutional challenges in this area of the law.111  These 
initial attacks on punitive damage restrictions centered on due process and 
equal protection.112  Many still argue these same points and contend that caps 
do not provide a means by which the purpose of punitive damages, deter-
rence, is promoted.113 
A.  The Shift Toward Favoring Legislative Limitations 
Early victories in challenging statutorily imposed restrictions on puni-
tive damages were short-lived, and the tide turned.114  A new trend developed 
signaling judicial acceptance of the power of legislatures to prioritize other 
social interests over the traditional purpose of punitive damages;115 the over-
whelming majority of federal and state courts continue to follow this trend 
 
 106. Id. at 150. 
 107. Janet V. Hallahan, Social Interests Versus Plaintiffs’ Rights: The Constitu-
tional Battle Over Statutory Limitations on Punitive Damages, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
405, 410 (1995). 
 108. Summer Ballentine, Business Lenders Lash Out Against Punitive Damages, 
NEWSTRIBUNE.COM (Sept. 12, 2014), http://www.newstribune.com/news/2014/ 
sep/12/business-leaders-lash-out-against-punitive-damages/ (spoken by Jay Atkins, 
general counsel and director of governmental affairs for the Missouri Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry). 
 109. Hallahan, supra note 107, at 419–22. 
 110. Id. at 419. 
 111. Id.; JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES 961–62 (2nd ed. 2006). 
 112. Hallahan, supra note 107, at 419. 
 113. Id. at 443.  Those who support this argument reason that defendants calculate 
the punitive damage caps into the costs of their actions; thus, it is argued that caps do 
not deter wrongdoers and, in turn, decrease safety standards.  Id. 
 114. Id. at 423. 
 115. Id. at 410. 
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today.116  Those who ride this new tide rely on several reasons to support 
their belief that statutory punitive damage restrictions are constitutional.  
First, it is argued that there is no constitutionally protected right to puni-
tive damages; many courts agree with this position.117  Proponents of statuto-
ry caps expand this argument and assert that because there is no right to puni-
tive damages, the legislature can constitutionally eliminate punitive damag-
es.118  Where such is the case, those in favor of statutory caps reason that the 
legislature should be able to limit punitive damages without violating consti-
tutional rights.119 
Second, the supporters of the new trend inquire why a judge can reduce 
a jury award through remittitur without violating the jury’s function, but the 
legislature cannot.120  Those on board with the new trend reason that the ju-
ry’s fact-finding function is preserved in either scenario.121  One attorney 
noted that “[t]he jury continues to resolve disputed facts with respect to liabil-
ity and assessment of legally available remedies.  Once the jury has decided 
these issues, the constitutional mandate is met . . . .”122 
Further, those in favor of statutory caps argue that the legislature, not 
the courts, should establish constitutionally acceptable punitive damages pro-
cedures.123  Proponents of this idea identify three reasons why the legislature 
is better equipped to establish such procedures: (1) the legislature can employ 
caps that strike a balance between societal benefits of deterrence and the re-
sultant costs imposed on a state’s economy; (2) the legislature is more likely 
to attain the goal of reasonableness in damages; and (3) the legislature is in 
the position to ensure that the legitimate purpose of punitive damages is en-
forced – that punitive damages will punish and deter, not provide a windfall 
to a plaintiff.124  Some courts have gone as far as implementing a presump-
tion that statutory limitations are valid as economic regulations and only al-
low this presumption to be overcome when it is shown that the limitations are 
arbitrary or irrational.125 
 
 116. Behrens, supra note 3. 
 117. Hallahan, supra note 107, at 443.  See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 
U.S. 1, 18–19 (1991) (the Court did not recognize a constitutional right to punitive 
damages, rather that punitive damages are permissible under some circumstances); 
Portia Kayser, Navigating Missouri Punitive Damages in the Wake of Lewellen v. 
Franklin, BAKER STERCHI COWDEN & RICE LLC (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.bscr-
law.com/?t=40&an=33412&format=xml&stylesheet=blog&p=5258. 
 118. See Hallahan, supra note 107, at 426; Kayser, supra note 117. 
 119. See Hallahan, supra note 107, at 426; Kayser, supra note 117. 
 120. See Hallahan, supra note 107, at 431. 
 121. Behrens, supra note 3. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Hallahan, supra note 107, at 413–14. 
 124. Id. at 416–17, 425. 
 125. Id. at 435 (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 
U.S. 59, 83 (1978)). 
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B.  An Explanation of Lewellen’s Departure 
With such an immensely dense history in which the nationwide trend is 
rooted, why did the opinion issued by the court in Lewellen v. Franklin fail to 
discuss any of the historical factors?126  This question can be answered by 
noting that the court in the instant case was primarily concerned with the con-
stitutionality of punitive damages in the context of the right to trial by jury.127  
With this issue at the forefront, the Lewellen court referenced the Missouri 
Constitution as opposed to weighing the historical factors used to resolve 
challenges in other contexts.128  As discussed in Part IV herein, the Lewellen 
court determined that the language “as heretofore enjoyed” and “shall remain 
inviolate” contained in Article I, Section 22(a) means that any change in the 
right to a jury determination of damages, as it existed in 1820 is unconstitu-
tional.129 
The court in Lewellen developed a two-step process for determining the 
constitutionality of a punitive damage award in Missouri;130 this process was 
developed without an explicit examination of the legislative purpose or the 
process’s effect.131  The first step requires a determination of whether the 
cause of action brought existed prior to 1820, and if so, whether that cause of 
action provided for a jury trial.132  If the answer to both of those inquiries is in 
the affirmative, then the court cannot constitutionally statutorily cap the puni-
tive damages awarded.  However, if the cause of action did not exist prior to 
1820, or existed prior to 1820 but did not provide the right to a trial by jury, a 
punitive damages cap can be applied constitutionally.133 
C.  The Significance of Lewellen 
The unanimous decision in Lewellen v. Franklin suggests that the Su-
preme Court of Missouri was ready to stand its ground on the matter and in-
dicated that the court is not concerned with following the apparent trend.  Is 
this good for Missouri?  What does this implicate for plaintiffs, defendants, 
and attorneys looking forward? 
 
 126. The Lewellen court struck down the punitive damages cap in the instant case 
and did not examine the legislative purpose of the statutory cap.  See Lewellen v. 
Franklin, 441 S.W.3d 136, 150 (Mo. 2014) (en banc).  This is completely at odds with 
the nationwide trend, which suggests that the judiciary should defer to the legislature 
and examine only whether the statute bears a rational relationship to the state’s legit-
imate purpose.  Hallahan, supra note 107, at 445. 
 127. See Lewellen, 441 S.W.3d at 142. 
 128. Id. at 142–43. 
 129. Id. at 143 (citing MO. CONST. art. I, § 22(a)). 
 130. Kayser, supra note 117. 
 131. See Lewellen, 441 S.W.3d at 150. 
 132. Kayser, supra note 117. 
 133. Id. 
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When one inquires whether the recent Lewellen decision is favorable or 
unfavorable for Missouri, the historical arguments for and against statutory 
caps are reintroduced.  On the one hand, many will argue that the striking of 
punitive damage caps is detrimental.  Missouri’s Lieutenant Governor, Peter 
Kinder, does not find the decision favorable and stated, “By removing the 
caps on some punitive damages awards, this ruling once again opens the 
floodgates for frivolous litigation by encouraging speculative lawsuits aimed 
at getting quick settlements to avoid the potential threat of multi-million dol-
lar punitive awards.”134  Lieutenant Governor Kinder also asserted that this 
was a blow to the State’s tort reform law, which took years of hard work.135  
Others have asserted that the decision allows for “potentially massive damage 
rulings”136 and communicate their “worry that the ruling could create a poor 
business climate within the state. . . .”137  While due process limitations and 
guidelines exist to limit awards, these critics are skeptical of their effective-
ness and point to recent cases where double and triple digit ratios have been 
awarded.138 
On the other hand, some will favor the court’s decision and rely on its 
reasoning for support.  These supporters will focus on the constitutional right 
to a jury trial and the importance of analyzing the specific facts of each case 
to arrive at an individualized, specific determination of the punitive damage 
award.139  Additionally, those that view Lewellen as a favorable decision are 
likely to advance the importance of allowing “the people” to determine dam-
ages by keeping the decision “out of the hands of the legislatures and in the 
hands of jury members. . . .”140 
Looking forward, parties and their attorneys must be prepared to face 
the new implications of the Lewellen decision.  Plaintiffs seeking punitive 
damages must be attentive in electing their cause of action and should aim to 
bring their claim under a common law cause of action if they hope to recover 
 
 134. Collin Reischman, Missouri Supreme Court Invalidates Cap on Punitive 
Damages, THE MO. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2014), http://themissouritimes.com/13110/ mis-
souri-supreme-court-invalidates-cap-punitive-damages/. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Punitive Damages Ruling Alarms Missouri Business Leaders, KAN. CITY 
BUS. J. (Sept. 12, 2014, 7:51 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/blog/ 
morning_call/2014/09/punitive-damages-ruling-alarms-missouri-business.html.  
Business owners are concerned and worried about the possibility of exposure to hefty 
punitive damages.  Ballentine, supra note 108. 
 138. Kayser, supra note 117. 
 139. Liz Washam, Lillian Lewellen v. Chad Franklin and National Auto Sales: 
Missouri Supreme Court Unanimously Finds Mandatory Caps on Punitive Damages 




 140. Id. 
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a large amount of punitive damages.  Plaintiffs asserting a common law cause 
of action can take advantage of the striking of the cap, as the court opened 
doors for plaintiffs that the legislature had previously closed.  Plaintiffs in this 
context are no longer limited to $500,000 or five times the judgment award-
ed, rather they can seek damages exceeding these amounts if they can prove 
the damages by a clear and convincing standard of proof. 
Defendants and defense attorneys must be aware of the risk of large pu-
nitive damage awards when defending in Missouri as well.  Clients develop-
ing businesses may wish to be advised of and consider the effects of Lewellen 
in determining where to locate their business, as there is a heightened chance 
that they will serve as defendants in a suit.  Additionally, all parties in the 
presence of a Missouri court must recognize that more discretion will be al-
lowed in awarding punitive damages.  The removal of the statutory cap re-
moves a great deal of consistency and predictability from the law.  Analysis 
of Gore’s three guideposts will become very important, and attorneys must be 
prepared to present a strong case for their client in regard to these three fac-
tors. 
It is evident that wrongdoers should be punished for their unlawful ac-
tions.  However, allowing such punishment with no restraint is perilous and 
can result in exceptionally unfair results.  While many take a side – either for 
or against statutory caps on punitive damages – it may be possible that the 
legislative restrictions are appropriate in certain contexts and inappropriate in 
others. 
An evaluation of prior case law clearly indicates that statutory caps 
serve a valid purpose. While many challenge them, or outright reject them, 
the fact that many states have enforced them speaks to their effectiveness in 
providing a solution to the difficulties presented by punitive damages.   Alt-
hough due process places a limitation on these awards, historical analysis 
evinces that due process alone often does not produce an outcome that sits 
well with courts. 
Establishing that statutes such as Section 510.265 are beneficial to the 
law, is it not possible that Lewellen strikes a sound balance?  The statutory 
cap in Missouri applies to a wide array of causes of action.  Lewellen only 
removed the statutory cap from the small class of common law claims availa-
ble in 1820 that were entitled to a jury determination of punitive damages.  
The court’s reason for this was a good one – the language of the Missouri 
Constitution.  If you look at this as two distinct groups of claims, group one 
being common law claims providing for a jury determination of punitive 
damages and group two being all other claims, it is clear that Lewellen does 
not neglect the history of Missouri law; rather, it does the opposite – it de-
fends it.  The Missouri Constitution provides for an unrestricted right to a 
jury trial in certain causes of action; these rights should remain immutable.  
When the need for statutory limitations is weighed against the essential rights 
granted to Missouri citizens, it is glaring that the durability of the Missouri 
Constitution should prevail.  Because the Missouri Constitution does not re-
quire a jury trial to determine punitive damages in causes of action developed 
16
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post-1820, this overbearing factor of essential rights is not present; thus, there 
is no clash and the need for statutory limitations prevails. 
The opinion’s lack of clarification and the subsequent discussion that 
has ensued has caused a misunderstanding; the Lewellen decision did not 
strike the statutory cap on punitive damages in every case.  Thus, the decision 
may not have the extreme impact that it is predicted to have. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The statutory cap on punitive damages, imposed by Section 510.265, 
raises the complex issue of whether statutory caps on punitive damages in-
fringe an individual’s constitutional right to a trial by jury.  In Lewellen v. 
Franklin, the Supreme Court of Missouri struck Missouri’s statutory cap on 
punitive damages in cases rooted in common law because it deemed such a 
restriction unconstitutional in those cases.  With this decision, Missouri de-
parts from the history of punitive damages and the current trend, which 
makes clear that restrictions on punitive damages continue to be an unsettled 
area of the law.  Looking to the future, there is no question that the instant 
decision will affect Missouri law, and while all can speculate exactly what 
affect this ruling will have, only time will tell. 
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